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Abstract- IoT data security is one of the core unresolved challenges in IoT community. Lack of 
resource-efficient authenticated secure key exchange methods among resource- constrained IoT 
devices makes man-in-the-middle attacks a serious vulnerability. In this regard, we propose 1(One) 
pass Authenticated Key Agreement (AKA) protocol for IoT applications. This protocol requires only 
one round of communication among the sender and receiver to establish a secure session, providing a 
balance between security (data confidentiality with integrity) and performance. We implemented and 
performed comprehensive power consumption and timing analysis of our implementation on Contiki 
platform to demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed protocol. 
 
Index terms: IoT, Sensor Networks, Security, Identity Based Encryption, Elliptic Curve Cryptography. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Uses of sensing based Internet of Things (IoT) applications have been expanding rapidly in 
many fields such as factory and building automation, environmental monitoring, health care, 
and in a wide variety of consumer and military application areas. Advancements in micro 
electro-mechanical systems and wireless communication have motivated the development of 
small and low power sensors and radio equipped modules that are replacing traditional wired 
sensor systems. These modules can communicate with each other by radio to receive and 
transmit data, and form networked embedded systems. Hence sensing based IoT applications 
have shown much promise to become a driver of current and future cyber physical system 
design. Currently, researchers are developing various types of software applications at different 
protocol level of IoT. Implementation of sensing applications is usually done using mostly 
battery powered micro sensing platform. In academia, researchers use operating systems, such 
as TinyOS [14], Contiki [6], ZigBee [3] stack etc., whereas industry uses their proprietary stack 
to develop applications in IoT devices. 
Developing IoT applications in micro-sensing device is a challenging task, because most of the 
available sensor nodes (also called “motes”) on the market (such as MTM-CM5000-MSP [17] 
,TelosB[26] and others) have tight constraints on computation and communication resources.  
Moreover, data sensitive applications like bio- medical sensing, industrial automation, military 
applications and others require stringent commitment of data and key security. It is fundamental 
that traditional sensor networks should have the capability to avoid eavesdropping, injection 
and modifications of packets [11].  If a suitable security capability is not available the efficiency 
and reliability of the network will be decreased [27]. Hence, security services like 
authentication and key management are crucial to IoT applications. To enforce security in IoT 
applications, security services and protocol based on PKC (such as SSL, IPsec, etc.) are widely 
used. For example, PKC is employed to bootstrap symmetric session keys and also to 
authenticate messages between sender and receiver. Traditionally, protocols and algorithms 
based on public key require extensive computation resources which are not typically available 
in IoT sensing platforms.  
Traditional key agreement protocols allow parties to agree on a secret key at beginning of each 
communication session. The communication channel is assumed to be insecure. To this end, the 
parties exchange messages and use local secret values. However, the adversary is able to read 
and modify the messages that are transmitted through the channel. There are two different types 
of adversary: 
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1. Eavesdropper: An adversary that observers the communication between two nodes and 
tries to learn information about underlying messages. This adversary does not 
modify/delete/cancel any message exchanged among honest parties. 
2. Malicious: This adversary is allowed to modify/delete and drop any communication 
between two honest parties at any time. Also, this adversary can initiate a session with 
an honest party. This often happens after compromising an honest party and trying to 
connect to an uncorrupted party with the network. This type of adversary can perform a 
strong class of attacks known as Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks. In MITM, the 
adversary places in between the two honest parties and intercepts the communication. In 
key agreement protocols, the adversary forges the honest receiver to the honest sender 
and also forges the honest sender to the honest receiver. Therefore, each honest party 
falsely assumes that it has established a secret key to the other. 
 
Note that using a shared “network secret key” fails to provide security. If one node is corrupted 
by the adversary then the adversary will have access to this shared secret and the security of the 
entire network will be compromised [30]. We can’t rely on a solution with fixed shared 
pairwise secret keys since this approach is not efficient, dynamic or scalable. Therefore, we 
need a scalable and efficient solution that enables any node to establish a secure channel to 
another entity without a pre-shared key or interaction with a third trusted center. In addition and 
to prevent MITM attacks, each party needs to authenticate the other and establish a secret key 
that is private from all other nodes (with possible exception of a root/master node). 
Authenticated Key Agreement (AKA) protocols are designed to address this issue. However, 
the computational and communication complexity of such protocols is considerable especially 
in constraint environments. Communication complexity is often measured in the number of 
messages exchange between parties. On the other hand, computation complexity is measured in 
the most time consuming operations. AKA protocols usually rely on public key cryptographic 
operations to be scalable. Therefore the number of exponentiation or similar operations is the 
measure of computation complexity. However, research has shown that communication 
complexity has a more prominent impact on battery consumption than computation. Therefore, 
the fewer message exchanges the better a protocol performs. 
A one-pass AKA protocol is a key agreement protocol where the initiator only sends one 
message (however long) to the responder and both parties are able to compute a session locally 
using the transmitted message and internal secret values. This type of AKA protocols finishes 
only in one round. If there are two rounds involved we call such a protocol a two-pass protocol. 
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Three major and different notions of security in Authenticated Key Agreement (AKA) 
protocols are as follows: 
 
1. Known-Key Secrecy (K-KS): In this notion, an adversary has gained access to session 
keys of other communication sessions. A protocol under this notion should provide 
security for the current session which is under attack. This is considered as the minimum 
level of a secure AKA protocol. 
2. Perfect Forward Security (PFS): In this case, if an adversary can learn the long-term 
private key of a party then the adversary should not be able to recover the previous 
agreed session keys. It was shown by Krawczyk ([13]) that no protocol achieves PFS 
with two or fewer messages. 
3. Key-Compromise Impersonation (K-CI) Security: In this case, an adversary has learned 
the long-term private key of a party, A. If the adversary cannot masquerade as another 
party (say, B) to A then the underlying AKA is K-CI secure. The work in [13] mentions 
that protocols which rely on using long-term static keys based on the difficulty of the 
discrete log problem to achieve a session key are insecure against K-CI attacks. 
In this work, we consider only one-pass AKA solutions. This is due to the computational and 
communication restrictions on the IoT devices. Therefore, we can only achieve MITM and K-
KS security against an active adversary. We argue that this is a valid assumption since in IoT 
applications often the devices are too limited in their computation and communication power 
and expensive solutions that provide higher security are too demanding. Thus, it is considered 
the best to protect a party’s long-term private key than implementing costly protocols that offer 
security in situations where the long-term private key is compromised. In fact, in IoT 
applications, MITM attacks are more serious issues since an attacker can easily impersonate a 
valid mote of a network and recover all messages sent and received from that node. Thus, our 
goal is to design and implement a secure AKA protocol with low power consumption footprint 
for resource-limited sensor nodes. We then measure execution time and power consumption of 
our proposed method. We argue the feasibility of adapting our AKA protocol in various 
applications that rely on constraint devices. Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is chosen since 
among PKC solutions for the same level of security, it requires smaller key sizes. Hence, ECC 
solutions can reduce memory and power consumption while providing an acceptable level of 
security. 
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II. RELATED WORK 
 
Contiki ([7]) is an open source, portable and event-driven Real-Time OS(RTOS) for memory-
constrained embedded systems with a focus on low-power communication. Thus it is a good 
platform candidate for Internet of Things devices. Contiki is able to support various hardware 
platforms such as the Tmote Sky and MICAz. These platforms are built using low-power 
micro-controllers such as the TI MSP430 and the Atmel AVR. Contiki kernel is not protected 
from applications. This allows an application to access and/or corrupt global or event data that 
belongs to the underlying operating system. 
 
The work of Casado et al. in ContikiSec ([4]) provides symmetric key security functionality on 
network layer for Contiki OS. Their work only considers offering three security mode options: 
confidentiality-only (ContikiSec- Enc), message authentication-only (ContikiSec-Auth), and 
authentication with encryption (ContikiSec-AE). Note that ContikiSec does not address the 
issue of key agreement (let alone AKA) and is only limited to providing symmetric key security 
functionalities. Karlof et al. in [12] had done a similar work for TinyOS in link layer and [8] 
considered network layer symmetric key functionality for IPv6 in WSN. The authors are not 
aware of any efficient key agreement tool designed for Contiki. 
Identity Based Encryption (IBE) is a public key encryption scheme where the public key is 
generated using the identity of the entity ([2]). IBE requires a master public/private key. This 
pair of keys is generated by a master entity known as Private Key Generator (PKG). Anyone 
can compute the public key of an entity given their ID and the master public key. However, 
only PKG can compute any entity’s private key. IBE is used to prevent MITM attacks. 
However, the idea of using IBE in WSN isn’t new (e.g., [20, 28, 29, 5, 24]). Oliveria et al. in 
[20] implement ECC pairing that leads to establishment of long term secrete keys. In contrast, 
this work examines authenticated secure communication session establishment in Contiki with 
timing as well as power consumption experiments. In this work we demonstrate the 
computational and power consumption impact of our IBE-ECC-based protocol in Contiki 
sensors with TinyECC as the main library. We demonstrate the performance of our protocol in 
this setting. To the best of our knowledge, there is no efficient IBE-based work for 
authenticated session key agreement in WSN. In this work, not only we propose an efficient and 
secure IBE based AKA protocol but also we perform time and power consumption analysis of 
our implementation. 
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III. PROPOSED METHOD 
 
We have an elliptic curve with parameters P, a, b, p, g, h where p is the prime modulus and g is 
the order of P which is a point on the elliptic curve constructed by a, b. For more on elliptic 
curve cryptography (ECC) refer to [9]. h is any secure hashing function of appropriate digest 
size. 
 To provide dual authentication in our protocol we will rely on a specific class of 
encryption, Identity Based Encryption (IBE). In IBE the public key of any user is tied to their 
identity. Therefore, any node can compute the public key of another node locally as long as the 
receiver’s ID is known and the sender has access to a master public key. In this setting, there is 
a dedicated entity (e.g., master node or PKG) that generates a pair of master public and private 
key. Any node’s public/private key is computed using the master keys and the node’s identity. 
A simple IBE-ECC encryption scheme is demonstrated below. We assume that the master 
entity has generated an array of random integers with appropriate size (Xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n). This 
array is the private key of the master entity. Consequently, the master public key will be an 
array Y where for each element we have Yi = XiP using ECC point multiplication. The master 
public key is published public key or pre-programmed in any node’s memory. 
For a node of ID “str”, the Master node can calculate its private key (random integer Xstr ) and 
public key (random point of the curve, Ystr ) as follow: 
 Xstr = ∑ hi(str).Xi where hi represents the ith bit value of the output of function h and 
Ystr = ∑ hi(str).Yi. 
Note that to compute any node’s public key, only its identity (“str”) and the master public 
key is required. In our approach we use the work of Tan et.al. from [25]. 
If party A wants to talk to party B then A reaches out to obtain B’s public key (YstrB). A sends to 
B in plaintext a random number, r. Since we use an IBE-ECC as the underlying public key 
scheme then parties need not to exchange their public key to establish a secure session. Each 
party computes the public key of the other party locally. Therefore, MITM attacks are 
prevented. The use of a random r ensures that the generated key belongs only to the current 
session. Below we present our 1-pass AKA protocol. We assume that the parties can compute 
each other’s public key locally and store them temporarily in memory for the sake of AKA 
execution. This means that all parties have the master public key stored in their memory. 
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1-passAKA 
 
 
 
1. Party A generate a fresh random number r of fixed length. A sends to B in plaintext the 
message: ID(A), r 
where ID(A) represents the ID of party A. 
 
2. Both parties locally compute Elliptic curve point Q = XstrAYstrB = XstrBYstrA = 
(Qx, Qy) using their secret keys and other party’s public keys. 
3. Compute locally Kr = HMAC(Hash(Qx)||Hash(Qy), r||ID(A)||ID(B)) where || denotes 
concatenation. HMAC uses Hash function which is SHA256 in our approach. 
 
4. Compute the encryption key, Ke = HMAC(Kr, r||salte) where salte is publicly 
known. We can assume that for a pair A, B we have salte = 
ID(A)||ID(B)||string(tEncKeyt). 
5. Compute the MAC key as Km = HMAC(Kr, r||saltm) where saltm is publicly 
known. We can assume that for a pair A, B we have saltm = 
ID(A)||ID(B)||string(tMacKeyt). 
 
 
 
 
The security of our AKA solution can be stated as follows: 
 
Theorem 1  Assuming security of prior building blocks, the above protocol is secure against an 
eavesdropper. 
 
Proof 1 (Proof sketch) We sketch the security of the above protocol using the work of [1]. 
In [1], Bellare showed that if the underlying hash function of an HMAC is a Pseudo 
Random Function (PRF) then the HMAC is PRF as well. A PRF is a keyed function where a 
polynomial time adversary, A without the key cannot distinguish the output of the function 
from a truly random value unless with negligible probability. If we replace our SHA256 
building block with a true PRF (i.e., in a random oracle model) then the output of HMAC 
in line 3 of the above protocol is indistinguishable from a true random value if Q is kept 
private. This confirms eavesdropper and K-KS security of our approach. 
 
As for complexity analysis of the above protocol, the dominant computational operation 
is elliptic curve multiplication (in line 2).  However, we note that this computation can be 
carried out in advance and the result (Q) can be stored in memory to be used for future 
session establishment. As for communication complexity, we observe that only one message 
is sent (in line 1). The size of this message depends on the size of ID and size of r. We advise 
against re-using r and therefore the size of r should be proportional to the logarithm of the 
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total number of sessions that will be established between a pair of nodes. In our 
implementation we used 32 bits for size of r. 
 
a. Data Integrity Tag Segmentation 
 
Data integrity and message authentication is essential to data security. For any message before 
being sent in an insecure channel, we compute HMAC (hash message authentication code) and 
append it to the original message. We use the approach of Encrypt-then-MAC (Etm) as outlined 
in ISO/IEC 19772:2009 [10]. In this approach, given a message m, the sender first encrypts m 
under the encryption key (ke) and produces c = Encke (m). Then the sender computes t = 
HMACkm (c) where km is integrity key and is independent of ke. The underlying hash function 
in HMAC is a secure hash function. In our experiments we used either SHA1 (160 bits of 
message digest) or SHA256 (256 bits of message digest). The sender sends buffer = c||t. The 
receiver computes a new tag (tt) and accepts the message only if t = tt. The length of sent 
message is extended by the size of t (message digest). However, we note that in constrained 
devices, the exchanged data samples are small (as few as two bytes). 
 
Figure 1: ECC AKA Total Time 
 
Communication consumes considerable amount of energy, thus the fewer packages sent the 
longer the battery can last. One solution would be to postpone message integrity check. In 
this approach, for every M messages sent, one tag is computed and sent. It requires to 
maintain all M pack ages in memory at both sender and receiver. In addition, the integrity of 
a message is checked at a later time. This carries a risk that the receiver may act on a corrupt 
message only to discover later that the package was modified. This is another trade-off 
between security and cost (power consumption). The value of M is, therefore, critical. This 
value depends on the size of payload that is exchanged between two nodes in an IoT network. 
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We note that the payload size is often smaller than the encryption block size (AES’s block 
size is 16 bytes). If the payload size (PL) is less than the block size (BL = 16 in bytes) then we 
set M = BL/PL Otherwise we set M = 1. We then define the message expansion rate (MER) as 
the ratio of total sent message including integrity tag versus message size with no integrity. 
This ratio indicates the overhead associated with message integrity. If we follow the 
segmentation rule above regarding M and indicate hash digest size with HD with encryption in 
counter mode then we have: 
 
MER = (MPL + HD)/(MPL) = 1 + HD/(BL) (1) 
 
Note that the overhead shown above is less than the overhead with no integrity 
segmentation (MER = 1 + HD/PL). In fact, the reduction is 100(M − 1)/M percent. This 
reduced overhead also depends only the hash digest size since encryption block size is 
constant. In our experiment, we used payloads of size PL = 4 bytes and therefore M = 4 and 
MER was reduced by 75 percent. 
 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
We implement the proposed authenticated session key agreement protocol on Contiki platform. 
We use TinyECC ([15]) as a software package for ECC-based operations. TinyECC is 
intended for TinyOS operating system and is implemented in nesC, but was converted to be 
used with Contiki in C. TinyECC supports SECP 128-bit, 160- bit, and 192-bit elliptic curve 
domain parameters. It supports all elliptic curve operations over Fp, such as point addition, 
doubling, and scalar point multiplication. We conducted our experiments with TMote Sky, 
ultra-low power wireless sensor nodes. TMote Sky is equipped with The TI MSP430, a 
family of ultra-low power micro- controllers. This device features a 16-bit RISC CPU, 2 16-
bit timers, and constant generators that contribute to maximum code efficiency. We utilized 
some additional features in this work such as the Universal Asynchronous 
Receiver/Transmitter (UART), Watchdog Timer, and two 16-Bit Timers. We also utilized Cooja, 
a Contiki simulator ([21]). We tested our protocol on a simple application where if the sender’s 
light sensor value passes a predefined threshold, the light value will be encrypted with a tag 
and sent to the receiver, in which the receiver will turn on or off its LEDs. The authors are not 
aware of any previous work that implements a one-pass AKA protocol in the above setting. 
Therefore, a comparison of experimental evaluations with related work is not possible currently. 
 
a. Setup 
 
Each node contains variables NodeID, PrivateKey, PublicKey, and MasterPublicKey are 
programmed by the base station (Master Node). The size of the MasterPublicKey array is 
dependent on the digest size of the hash function that is used in IBE-ECC-hash. We used two 
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cases of CRC-16 and CRC-32 in our experiments. All nodes have the same MasterPublcKey 
and each node has their own unique NodeID, PrivateKey, and PublicKey. NodeIDs all have 
same size. For message integrity we implemented two cases of SHA-1 (160 bit digest) and 
SHA-256 (256 bit digest). We used secp128r1, secp128r2, secp160k1, secp160r1, secp160r2, 
secp192k1 and secp192r1 for ECC parameters in our experiments. Therefore, there are total of 
28 different cases in our experiments (seven cases of elliptic curves, two cases of IBE-ECC-
hash and two cases of SHA). We set the AES key size to 128 bits as it provides 64 bits of 
security (due to birthday attack) and is a common choice for a lot of devices including IoT 
devices. We use counter mode for our encryption as it is a fast, secure and a common mode for 
IoT encryption applications. We also assumed node discovery was done and each sender node 
knows the RIME address of the receiver. 
 
b. Execution Time Method 
 
There are two methods used to measure the time consumed by software to perform various 
operations. The first method is to use MSPSim to execute the program and perform a profile 
dump which will output the amount of clock cycles that was spent in a particular function. This 
method relies on a simulator to be as accurate as the node itself. The second method is to utilize 
the MSP430 real-time timers, which is setup by Contiki. These real-time timers are highly 
accurate and can be utilize to capture execution time. There are two types of timers in Contiki 
which are utilized: CTimer and RTimer. These timers are hardware dependent which utilizes 
ACLK, with the Tmote Sky ACLK is a 32,768Hz clock.  RTimer is a 16-bit counter that 
increments approximately every 30.517 micro-second and will overflow after approximately 2 
seconds.  In Contiki, CTimer is also a 16-bit counter that is configurable to increment based on 
CLOCK CONF SECOND, which must be a power of two.  Using the Tmote Sky, CLOCK 
CONF SECOND is setup to be 128, which means the CTimer counter will increment every 
7.8125 milli-seconds and the counter will overflow after approximately 8.53 minutes. 
Depending on the function, using RTimer may not be the best option to capture the 
execution time due to chances of the timer counter overflowing. Instead, both CTimer and 
RTimer were used to see the difference. Using the compiler directive DEBUG TIME, it will 
compile the code that will output the execution time for a particular function. The compiler 
directive is used because of the additional code size and is only useful when gathering statistics. 
DEBUG TIME will compile two additional functions start statTimer() and stop statTimer().  
statTimer() will store the initial timer values of CTimer and RTimer by using Contiki built-in 
functions clock time() and RTIMER NOW(). After the initial timer values are stored, the 
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function that we want to gather execution time will be executed, at the end stop statTimer() will 
be called which will compute the difference between the initial timer values with the current 
timer values, and print out the statistics. 
Execution time for each function was measured using CTimer and RTimer. As an 
example, the function for computing the receiver’s public key took 177/128 = 1.3828125 
seconds by using CTimer, but with RTimer it calculated to be 45287/32768 = 1.3820495 
seconds, which has more precision. In this case it is more useful to use RTimer. But, when 
looking at the function for generating the common secret in 1passAKA), it is useful to use 
CTimer because RTimer will wrap around, while CTimer will maintain the correct elapsed 
time. Table b. shows approximate execution time for each method of our 1passAKA handshake 
protocol using the above measurement method. Figure 1, shows the total amount of execution 
time it took for each combination of parameters. We can see that the overall time for the 
protocol when an ECC curve of 192 bits is used is approximately 80 seconds. This is compared 
to a ECC curve of 128 bits which is approximately under 30 seconds. 
 
c.  Elliptic curve addition and multiplication 
 
As it can be seen from table b., elliptic curve addition (in function RECV PUBLIC KEY which 
computes the public key of other node) and multiplication (in function COMMON SECRET 
which computes point Q on the curve) from our 1pass AKA protocol take the longest time. In 
fact, the overall execution time of our protocol is mainly dominated by COMMON SECRET 
function. Any improvement in these two underlying building blocks will improve the overall 
execution time significantly. We decided to run stress tests on these two operations and study 
their execution time further. We note that in our experiments we ported TinyECC library for all 
elliptic curve operations in Contiki. There are other libraries such as mbed TLS (formerly 
known as PolarSSL [19]), MoTE-ECC ([16]), NanoECC ([23]) and TinyIBE ([22]). The 
authors intend to implement 1passAKA using various ECC libraries and provide a complete 
comparison of 1passAKA’s performance in future. Nevertheless, our ECC operation stress tests 
using TinyECC library are of independent interest. 
 Figures 2 and 3 show the statistics gathered when doing a stress test of these operations 
(occurrences). Each operation was tested 1,000 times with the various curve parameters, each 
iteration was given random input values. Table 2 indicates a summary of our tests. The results 
of these stress tests are consistent with the values collected during execution time test of our 5 
protocol shown in Table 1. 
Mehrdad Aliasgari, Garrett Chan, and Mohammad Mozumdar, IOT-1-PASS-SECURITY: 1(ONE)-PASS AUTHENTICATED 
KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL FOR ENERGY CONSTRAINT IOT APPLICATIONS 
609 
 
 
Figure 2: Elliptic curve addition test 
 
 
Figure 3: Elliptic curve multiplication test 
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9 secp160k1 CRC16 SHA-1 0.122 0.092 1.39 38.13 0.671 0.183 25.45 0.214 25.54 0.336 25.57 39.62
10 secp160k1 CRC16 SHA-2 0.122 0.092 1.39 38.12 0.671 0.183 45.35 0.183 27.4 0.244 45.35 39.74
11 secp160k1 CRC32 SHA-1 0.122 0.061 1.8 38.13 0.366 0.183 27.19 0.214 25.54 0.244 25.57 40.11
12 secp160k1 CRC32 SHA-2 0.122 0.061 1.8 38.13 0.336 0.183 47.3 0.214 25.6 0.214 45.32 42.27
13 secp160r1 CRC16 SHA-1 0.122 0.092 1.34 48.77 0.671 0.183 27.16 0.214 25.57 0.336 25.54 50.3
14 secp160r1 CRC16 SHA-2 0.122 0.092 1.34 48.77 0.671 0.153 45.38 0.214 25.57 0.244 47.27 50.34
15 secp160r1 CRC32 SHA-1 0.122 0.061 1.68 48.83 0.366 0.183 25.51 0.214 25.57 0.244 25.54 50.38
16 secp160r1 CRC32 SHA-2 0.122 0.061 1.68 48.83 0.336 0.183 45.38 0.214 27.4 0.244 45.35 50.73
17 secp160r2 CRC16 SHA-1 0.122 0.092 1.37 49.52 0.671 0.275 25.45 0.214 25.57 0.244 25.54 51.07
18 secp160r2 CRC16 SHA-2 0.122 0.092 1.37 49.52 0.671 0.275 45.38 0.214 25.57 0.244 47.24 51.11
19 secp160r2 CRC32 SHA-1 0.122 0.061 1.73 49.6 0.366 0.153 25.45 0.214 27.19 0.244 25.63 51.52
20 secp160r2 CRC32 SHA-2 0.122 0.061 1.73 49.6 0.366 0.183 45.35 0.183 25.67 0.244 45.41 51.55
21 secp192k1 CRC16 SHA-1 0.366 0.122 1.91 77.2 0.763 0.153 25.51 0.214 27.19 0.244 25.54 79.3
22 secp192k1 CRC16 SHA-2 0.366 0.122 1.91 77.2 0.763 0.153 44.92 0.214 25.57 0.214 44.98 79.34
23 secp192k1 CRC32 SHA-1 0.366 0.092 2.46 77.13 0.397 0.153 25.45 0.214 27.31 0.244 25.57 79.77
24 secp192k1 CRC32 SHA-2 0.366 0.092 2.44 77.13 0.397 0.153 45.38 0.214 27.34 0.214 45.32 79.81
25 secp192r1 CRC16 SHA-1 0.366 0.122 1.92 77.2 0.763 0.153 27.19 0.183 25.54 0.244 25.54 79.3
26 secp192r1 CRC16 SHA-2 0.366 0.122 1.91 77.2 0.763 0.153 44.92 0.214 25.57 0.244 44.98 79.34
27 secp192r1 CRC32 SHA-1 0.366 0.092 2.46 77.13 0.397 0.153 25.45 0.214 25.63 0.244 27.31 79.77
28 secp192r1 CRC32 SHA-2 0.366 0.092 2.45 77.13 0.397 0.153 45.29 0.214 27.34 0.305 45.38 79.81
 
Table 2: 1Pass AKA Execution Time in seconds (s) or milliseconds (ms) 
 
d. Power consumption analysis 
In order to accurately measure the power consumption, we utilized the 2400 series SourceMeter. 
It allows a maximum of 1700 readings/second with a current range reading from 10A to 10pA. It 
can be programmed to be either a CCS (Controlled-Current Source) or a CVS (Controlled-
Voltage Source) along with measuring the current, voltage, and/or resistance that the circuit is 
experiencing. We used LabTracer 2.0 program in our experiments, which is made specifically for 
the SourceMeter. The SourceMeter was set to be a CVS (at 3 volts) and to measure the current 
and power consumed during operation. Power was calculated as the product of measured current 
and voltage. Our TMote Sky was supplied with power directly by the SourceMeter. The 
measurements were performed on both the sending node and the receiving node. As for the 
sender, there are two possible communication mode: blocking mode (keeps sending till it 
receives an acknowledgment from the receiver) or non-blocking (sends the message only once). 
In addition, three elliptic curve parameters of 128r1, 160r1 and 192r1 were tested in our power 
experiments. CRC16 and SHA-1 were used in all cases. In all modes and parameters, the nodes 
started at idle, followed by the execution of our 1passAKA protocol. Then the nodes were idle for 
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a few seconds and finally the green LED was turned on to indicate the successful termination of 
the protocol. 
 
Curve MIN MAX AVG STDEV 
secp128r1 114.72 138.52 126.05 3.40 
secp128r2 115.60 135.44 125.95 3.24 
secp160k1 171.75 201.93 187.28 4.56 
secp160r1 175.20 202.79 187.57 4.61 
secp160r2 172.73 203.77 187.43 4.72 
secp192k1 239.75 279.39 260.57 5.69 
secp192r1 240.63 279.39 260.85 5.69 
 
Table 3: Elliptic curve addition (milliseconds) 
 
 
Curve MIN MAX AVG STDEV 
secp128r1 21.66 26.77 24.35 0.72 
secp128r2 20.92 26.31 23.96 0.72 
secp160k1 40.38 49.71 45.24 1.20 
secp160r1 40.80 49.78 45.24 1.20 
secp160r2 40.85 49.73 45.17 1.20 
secp192k1 70.53 81.73 75.79 1.76 
secp192r1 70.48 81.52 75.81 1.77 
 
Table 4: Elliptic curve multiplication (seconds) 
 
 
 T128r1 T160r1 T192r1 Power 
Blocking Sender 26.64 50.31 79.32 5.4 
Non-Blocking Sender 25.93 49.25 - 5.3 
Receiver 25.78 49.63 79.25 5.3 
Mean 26.11 49.73 79.28 5.3 
 
Table 5: Results of the power tests in seconds and mill-watt 
 
Figures 4, 5 and 7 show the power consumption of our 1passAKA protocol for the blocking 
sender, non-blocking sender and the receiver respectively. Table 5 summarizes execution time 
and power consumption results. We noticed that the power consumption in all communication 
modes and all elliptic curve parameters was about 5.3mW. This power remained constant 
throughout the execution of our protocol. Therefore, the energy consumption is estimated as 
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5.3mW times the execution time. The longer the execution time, the more energy is consumed. 
Thus 192r1 elliptic curve setting imposes the biggest energy consumption yet provides the 
highest level of security. These experiments show the trade-off between security and energy 
consumption. 
  
Figure 4: Power Graph for Blocking Sender Figure 5: Power Graph for Non-Blocking Sender 
 
 
Figure 6: Power Graph for Receiver 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this work, we designed an efficient one-message-round authenticated session key agreement 
protocol to provide data confidentiality and integrity in IoT applications. Execution time and 
power consumption of our protocol in various settings were measured. We implemented our 
procotol for Contiki OS with TinyECC as the ECC library. We noticed that the main time 
consuming task in our protocol is the elliptic curve computation. Any optimization in this area 
is left as future work. In particular, studying the efficiency of different ECC libraries such as 
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mbed TLS [18] is an interesting future work. In addition, we noticed that our protocol consumes 
approximately 5.3mW which makes it suitable for IoT applications. 
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